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Abstract.
Two parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collabo-
rate in order to generate a surplus. Yet, the negotiation stage will be reached only
if at date 1 both parties pay their respective transaction costs. We show that the
expected total surplus may be larger when at date 1 the parties do not yet know
the size of the surplus that can be generated at date 2. Moreover, joint ownership
can be optimal under incomplete information even when it would be suboptimal
under complete information.
Keywords: transaction costs; property rights; bargaining; incomplete information;
joint ownership
JEL Classication: D23; D86; C78; L14; L24
 Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln,
Germany. Tel.: +49 221 470 5609. E-mail: <patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de>.
This is the working paper version of the following publication:
Schmitz, P.W. (2016). The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete
information. Economics Letters, Vol. 145, 3337.
1
1 Introduction
The property rights approach to the theory of the rm developed by Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) is widely regarded as a major advance in
microeconomics.1 The Grossman-Hart-Moore theory shows that when contracts
are incomplete, ownership matters. Due to contractual incompleteness, there
will be negotiations in the future. While these negotiations lead to an ex-post
e¢ cient outcome, the division of the surplus depends on the threatpoint which is
determined by the ownership structure. Hence, ownership inuences the incentives
to make surplus-enhancing investments.
The property rights approach has been criticized for its focus on investment
incentives. For instance, Moore (2016, p. 12) has recently argued that Hold-
up is important, but looking around the world, it seems that ex-post ine¢ cien-
cies are even more important.Similar arguments have been brought forward by
Williamson (2002), who emphasizes that transaction cost economics is focused on
ex-post ine¢ ciencies.2 In the present paper, we thus consider a variant of the
Grossman-Hart-Moore setup without investments. Instead, we introduce trans-
action costs as modelled by Anderlini and Felli (2006), which may imply that
negotiations do not take place, so ex-post ine¢ ciencies can occur.
Two parties, A and B, can collaborate in order to generate a surplus V .
From an ex-ante point of view, V is a random variable. Yet, in the rst of two
scenarios that we will consider, both parties know the realization of V from the
outset. Following Anderlini and Fellis (2006) insightful paper, we assume that
the negotiations between the two parties take place only if each party pays its
transaction cost c > 0.3 If the negotiations do not take place or if the parties do
not reach an agreement, each party gets its default payo¤, which is determined by
the ownership structure. The second scenario that we will consider is identical to
1Andrei Shleifer has recently pointed out that the Grossman-Hart incomplete contracts ap-
proach represents perhaps the most inuential advance in economic theory in the last thirty
years (see the back cover of Aghion et al., 2016). The property rights theory has been suc-
cessfully applied in various elds such as industrial economics, corporate nance, organizational
economics, international trade, privatization theory, and political economy.
2See also Hart and Moore (2008, p. 2), who argue that the emphasis on noncontractible
ex-ante investments seems overplayed: although such investments are surely important, it is
hard to believe that they are the sole drivers of organizational form.
3The transaction costs can be interpreted as the time spent preparingfor the negotiations.
For example, the parties must conceive of a suitable language to describe the states of na-
ture, they must gather information about the legal environment, and they have to spend time
arranging a way to meet (for more details, see Anderlini and Felli, 2006, pp. 226-228).
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the rst scenario, except that there is incomplete information; i.e., the realization
of V is learned by the parties only after they have decided whether to pay their
transaction costs.
At rst sight, one might guess that incomplete information can only be harm-
ful. Yet, this is not the case. Specically, suppose that there is joint ownership;
i.e., the partiesdefault payo¤s are zero (cf. Hart, 1995). Suppose party A has
bargaining power  2 (0; 1). Thus, when the negotiations take place, party A
gets V and party B gets (1   )V . Party A is willing to pay its transaction
costs only if c  V , while party B is willing to pay its transaction costs only if
c  (1   )V . If  = 1=2, the negotiations take place whenever 2c  V , which
is e¢ cient. Yet, when in the wording of Anderlini and Felli (2006) there is a
su¢ ciently strong mismatchbetween the (unequal) bargaining powers and the
(equal) transaction costs (e.g., if  < c=V ), then an ex-post ine¢ ciency may occur
(the negotiations do not take place even though V   2c > 0). Now observe that
under incomplete information, the parties pay their transaction costs if c  E[V ]
and c  (1  )E[V ]. Since c=E[V ] <  < c=V may hold for some realizations of
V , from an ex-ante point of view the expected total surplus can be larger under
incomplete information. Under complete information, the parties may sometimes
know too muchfor the negotiations to take place.
We also consider sole ownership by party A or partyB, such that the owner can
make a positive prot (smaller than V ) without collaboration. We will show that
under incomplete information joint ownership can yield a strictly larger expected
total surplus than sole ownership, even when sole ownership would be optimal
under complete information.
Related literature. To the best of my knowledge, Müller and Schmitz (2016)
is the only paper so far in which transaction costs as modelled by Anderlini and
Felli (2006) have been introduced into the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights
theory. However, in contrast to the present paper, Müller and Schmitz (2016)
do not consider incomplete information (instead, they focus on the interplay of
transaction costs and investments).4 The present paper also contributes to a
growing literature which shows that joint ownership can be optimal in variants
of the Grossman-Hart-Moore setup. See Gattai and Natale (2016) for a recent
survey of this literature.5
4See also Schmitz (2006) for an extension of the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory to the case of
asymmetric information. In this model, private information can be benecial because informa-
tion rents may enhance investment incentives.
5The Grossman-Hart-Moore theory has been criticized because their standard model cannot
explain joint ownership. For example, Holmström (1999) has stressed that joint ventures have
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2 The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, A and B, who at date t = 2 can negotiate about
whether to collaborate. If the parties agree to collaborate, they can generate a
date-2 surplus V . We assume that V 2 [0; 1] is a random variable with cumulative
distribution function F (V ). If the negotiations do not take place or if no agreement
is reached, at date t = 2 each party i 2 fA;Bg obtains only its default payo¤ doi 
0, where o 2 fA;B; Jg denotes the ownership structure (see Table 1). Specically,
if there is sole ownership by party i 2 fA;Bg, the owners default payo¤ is "V with
" 2 (0; 1), while the non-owners default payo¤ is zero. Hence, the owner can make
a positive prot, but collaboration would yield a larger surplus. In accordance
with the property rights approach (Hart, 1995), joint ownership (o = J) means
that each party has veto power such that both partiesdefault payo¤s are zero.
doA d
o
B
o = A "V 0
o = B 0 "V
o = J 0 0
Table 1. The partiesdate-2 default payo¤s.
Note that due to the symmetry of the default payo¤s, under A-ownership and
B-ownership the total surplus will be the same. Hence, in what follows we focus
on the comparison between sole ownership and joint ownership.6
2.1 Scenario I: Complete information
We consider two scenarios. In Scenario I, there is complete information (see Figure
1). Hence, the parties know the realization of V from the outset. At date 1, each
party decides whether to incur transaction costs c > 0.7 Let xA 2 f0; 1g denote
party As decision and let xB 2 f0; 1g denote party Bs decision. As in Anderlini
always been an important part of the corporate landscape. The close relationship between the
notion of joint ownership in the property rights theory and characteristics of joint ventures in
practice has been empirically conrmed by Gattai and Natale (2013).
6It is straightforward to generalize the model by assuming that under A-ownership party As
default payo¤ is "AV , while under B-ownership party Bs default payo¤ is "BV , where "A 6= "B .
7We focus on the symmetric case to simplify the exposition. It is straightforward to generalize
the model such that party As transaction costs are cA and party Bs transaction costs are cB .
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and Felli (2006), the negotiation stage is reached only if both parties pay their
transaction costs (xA = xB = 1).
partiesdefault payo¤s are zero. The partiesdefault payo¤s under the three
di¤erent ownership structures are summarized in Table 1.
doA d
o
B
o = A "V 0
o = B 0 "V
o = J 0 0
Table 1. The partiesdate-2 default payo¤s.
Note that due to the symmetry of the default payo¤s, under A-ownership
and B-ownbership the total surplus will be the same. Hence, in what follows
we focus on the comparison between sole ownership and joint ownership.6
2.1 Scenario I: Complete information
We will consider two scenarios. In Scenario I, there is complete information
(see Figure 1). Hence, the parties know the realization of V from the outset.
At date 1, each party decides whether or not to incur transaction costs c > 0.
Let xA 2 f0; 1g denote party As decison and let xB 2 f0; 1g denote party Bs
decision. The parties reach the negotiation stage only if both agents pay their
transaction costs (xA = xB = 1). Hence, we model transaction costs in the
same way as Anderlini and Felli (2006).
date 1 date 2
  j          j                j     
A and B learn A chooses xA 2 f0; 1g, If xA = xB = 1, then
realization of V. B chooses xB 2 f0; 1g. negotiations take place.
Figure 2. The sequence of events in Scenrio I (complete information).
If the date-2 negotiations take place, then the outcome of the negotiations
is given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where  denotes party As
6It is straightforward to generalize the model by assuming that under A-ownership party
As default payo¤ is "AV , while under B-ownership party Bs default payo¤ is "BV , where
"a 6= "B .
5
Figure 1. The sequence of events in Scenario I.
If th date-2 negotiations take place, then the outcome of he negotiations is
given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where  2 (0; 1) denotes party
As barg ining power and the threatpoint is given by the artiesdefault payo¤s.
Thus, under ownership structure o, party As payo¤ is
uoA(V ) =
8><>:
doA + (V   doA   doB)  c if xA = xB = 1,
doA   c if xA = 1, xB = 0,
doA otherwise,
and party Bs payo¤ is
uoB(V ) =
8><>:
doB + (1  )(V   doA   doB)  c if xA = xB = 1,
doB   c if xA = 0, xB = 1,
doB otherwise.
If a party does not pay its transaction cost, then it is the best reply for the
other party also not to pay its transaction cost. However, if c  (V  doA doB) and
c  (1 )(V  doA doB), then there is a second equilibrium in which both parties
pay their transaction costs. Following Anderlini and Felli (2006), we assume that
the latter equilibrium is played whenever it exists, because it Pareto-dominantes
the former equilibrium.8
Under sole ownership, both parties pay their transaction costs whenever c 
minf; 1  g(1  ")V . Under joint ownership, both parties pay their transaction
costs whenever c  minf; 1 gV . The expected total surplus levels So can thus
be characterized as follows.
8We thus assume that the parties coordinate on Pareto-perfect equilibria (cf. Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991). Alternatively, as has also been argued by Anderlini and Felli (2006), we could
assume that the parties have to pay their transaction costs sequentially (so there would be no
multiplicity of equilibria and the same results would be obtained as under the assumption of
Pareto perfection).
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Proposition 1 Consider Scenario I. The expected total surplus is
SA = SB =
8<:
R 1
c
minf;1 g(1 ")
(V   2c)dF (V ) + R cminf;1 g(1 ")0 "V dF (V ) if c  minf; 1  g(1  "),
"E[V ] otherwise,
under sole ownership and
SJ =
( R 1
c
minf;1 g
(V   2c)dF (V ) if c  minf; 1  g,
0 otherwise,
under joint ownership.
2.2 Scenario II: Incomplete information
Next, consider Scenario II. This scenario is identical to Scenario I, except that
there is incomplete information when the parties decide whether to pay their
transaction costs (see Figure 2).9
while under joint ownership, the expected total surplus is
SJ =
8<:
R 1
c
minf;1 g
(V   2c)dF (v) if c  minf; 1  g,
0 otherwise.
2.2 Scenario II: Incomplete information
Next, consider Scenario II. This scenario is identical to Scenario I, except that
there is incomplete information (see Figure 3) when the parties take their de-
cisions. The realization of V is learned by the parties only after the bargaining
stage.
date 1 date 2
    j               j          j    
A chooses xA 2 f0; 1g, If xA = xB = 1, then A and B learn
B chooses xB 2 f0; 1g. negotiations take place. realization of V.
Figure 3. The sequence of events in Scenario II (incomplete information).
In this case, the party As payo¤ is given by
~uoA =
(
doA + E[V   doA   doB]  c if xA = xB = 1,
doA otherwise,
and party Bs payo¤ is given by
~uoB =
(
doB + (1  )E[V   doA   doB]  c if xA = xB = 1,
doB otherwise.
Under sole ownership, the parties pay the transaction costs whenever c 
minf; 1  g(1  ")E[V ]. Under joint ownership, theh parties pay the trans-
action costs whenever c  minf; 1 gE[V ]. Thus, the expected total surplus
levels ~S = ~uoA + ~u
o
B can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 Consider Scenario II (incomplete information). Under sole
ownership, the expected total surplus is
~SA = ~SB =
(
E[V ]  2c if c  minf; 1  g(1  ")E[V ],
"E[v] otherwise,
while under joint ownership, the expected total surplus is
~SJ =
(
E[V ]  2c if c  minf; 1  gE[V ],
0 otherwise.
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Figure 2. The sequence of events in Scenario II.
In this case, party As payo¤ reads
~uoA =
8><>:
E[doA] + E[V   doA   doB]  c if xA = xB = 1,
E[doA]  c if xA = 1, xB = 0,
E[doA] otherwise,
and party Bs payo¤ is
~uoB =
8><>:
E[doB] + (1  )E[V   doA   doB]  c if xA = xB = 1,
E[doB]  c if xA = 0, xB = 1,
E[doB] otherwise.
Und r sole ownership, the parties pay the transaction costs whenever c  minf; 1 
g(1 ")E[V ]. Under joint ownership, the parties pay the transaction costs when-
ever c  minf; 1   gE[V ]. Thus, the expected total surplus levels ~So can be
characterized as follows.
9Note that the realization of V is learned by the parties only after the bargaining stage. We
could alternatively assume that the parties learn the realization of V between dates 1 and 2,
which would yield the same expected surplus levels.
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Proposition 2 Consider Scenario II. The expected total surplus is
~SA = ~SB =
(
E[V ]  2c if c  minf; 1  g(1  ")E[V ],
"E[v] otherwise,
under sole ownership and
~SJ =
(
E[V ]  2c if c  minf; 1  gE[V ],
0 otherwise,
under joint ownership.
3 Implications
First, we explore the optimality of joint ownership for a given information struc-
ture.
If  ! 0 or  ! 1, then regardless of the information structure the expected
total surplus is zero under joint ownership, while it is "E[v] under sole owner-
ship. Hence, joint ownership cannot be optimal if the mismatchbetween the
transaction costs and the bargaining power is too strong.
Now consider the case  = 1=2 and c < (1  ")E[V ]=2. In this case, according
to Proposition 1
SA   SJ =
Z 1
2c
1 "
(V   2c)dF (V ) +
Z 2c
1 "
0
"V dF (V ) 
Z 1
2c
(V   2c)dF (V )
=
Z 2c
1 "
2c
["V   (V   2c)] dF (V ) +
Z 2c
0
"V dF (V ) > 0;
so joint ownership is suboptimal given complete information. Yet, Proposition 2
implies that in the case under consideration, if there is incomplete information, the
expected total surplus is E[V ]  2c regardless of the ownership structure. Hence,
joint ownership is among the optimal ownership structures. Moreover, if  6= 1=2,
then under incomplete information joint ownership can even yield a strictly larger
expected total surplus than sole ownership, while under complete information sole
ownership would still be optimal. As an illustration, see Figure 3. Observe that
under complete information joint ownership is optimal only for small ranges of
the bargaining power , while under incomplete information joint ownership is
optimal for larger parameter ranges.10
10Our nding that joint ownership can be optimal under incomplete information even when
it would be suboptimal under complete information is in line with Pisanos (1989) observation
that joint ventures are particularly prevalent in the context of R&D activities (where incomplete
information is likely to play an important role).
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Corollary 1 (i) If ! 0 or ! 1, then sole ownership is optimal, regardless of
the information structure.
(iii) For intermediate values of , joint ownership can be optimal, regardless
of the information structure. Moreover, joint ownership can be optimal under
incomplete information even when it is suboptimal under complete information.
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Figure 3. Expected total surplus levels in the case F (v) = v, " = 1=3, and c = 0:15.
Next, we investigate the e¤ects of the information structure for a given own-
ership structure.
If  ! 0 or  ! 1, then under sole ownership the expected total surplus
is "E[V ], while under joint ownership it is zero, regardless of the information
structure. Moreover, if  = 1=2 and c < (1  ")E[V ]=2, then
SA   ~SA =
Z 1
2c
1 "
(V   2c)dF (V ) +
Z 2c
1 "
0
"V dF (V ) 
Z 1
0
(V   2c)dF (V )
=
Z 2c
1 "
0
[2c  (1  ")V ] dF (V ) > 0;
and
SJ   ~SJ =
Z 1
2c
(V   2c)dF (V ) 
Z 1
0
(V   2c)dF (V )
=
Z 2c
0
[2c  V ] dF (V ) > 0:
Hence, in this case the expected total surplus is larger under complete information
than under incomplete information. Yet, the opposite result may also hold; i.e.,
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the parties may know too much.If under sole ownership  = c
(1 ")E[V ] < 1=2,
then
SA   ~SA =
Z 1
E[V ]
(V   2c)dF (V ) +
Z E[V ]
0
"V dF (V ) 
Z 1
0
(V   2c)dF (V )
=
Z E[V ]
0
[2c  (1  ")V ] dF (V ):
This expression is negative if c is su¢ ciently small. Similarly, if under joint own-
ership  = c=E[V ] < 1=2, then
SJ   ~SJ =
Z 1
E[V ]
(V   2c)dF (V ) 
Z 1
0
(V   2c)dF (V )
=
Z E[V ]
0
[2c  V ] dF (V );
which is negative for small transaction costs. Figure 4 illustrates the fact that the
expected total surplus can be strictly larger under incomplete information than
under complete information. This e¤ect occurs for larger parameter ranges when
there is joint ownership.
Corollary 2 (i) If  ! 0 or  ! 1, then for a given ownership structure the
expected total surplus does not depend on the information structure.
(ii) If  = 1=2, then the expected total surplus is larger under complete infor-
mation than under incomplete information, regardless of the ownership structure.
(iii) If  6= 1=2, then the expected total surplus can be larger under incom-
plete information than under complete information, regardless of the ownership
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Figure 4. Expected total surplus levels in the case F (v) = v, " = 1=3, and c = 0:06.
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